Water Quality Trading Programs: An International Overview by Cy Jones et al.
Water quality trading is gaining traction in a number of watersheds 
around the world. It is a market-based approach that works along-
side water quality regulation to improve water quality, providing 
fl exibility in how regulations are met and potentially lowering regu-
latory compliance and abatement costs. Our research identifi ed 57 
water quality trading programs worldwide. Of these, 26 are active, 
21 are under consideration or development, and 10 are inactive or 
are completed pilots with no plans for future trades. The majority of 
programs were located in the United States, with only six programs 
existing outside the United States—four in Australia, one in New 
Zealand, and one in Canada. 
From our assessment of these water quality trading programs, we 
identifi ed fi ve key factors that stakeholders believed were important 
for the successful implementation of their trading programs:
• Strong regulatory and/or non-regulatory drivers, which helped cre-
ate a demand for water quality credits;
• Minimal potential liability risks to the regulated community from 
meeting regulations through trades;
• Robust, consistent, and standardized estimation methodologies for 
nonpoint source actions;
• Standardized tools, transparent processes, and online registries to 
minimize transaction costs; and
• Buy-in from local and state stakeholders.
Before going to the expense of developing a water quality trading pro-
gram, we recommend that the relevant bodies—either governmental 
or nongovernmental—ensure these factors are in place.
Summary
www.wri.org10 G Street, NE    Washington, DC 20002
Tel: 202-729-7600     Fax: 202-729-7610
MARCH 2009
WRI ISSUE BRIEF





MINDY SELMAN, SUZIE GREENHALGH, 
EVAN BRANOSKY, CY JONES, AND JENNY GUILING
Setting the Scene
Water quality is one of the most pressing environmental 
concerns facing many parts of the world today. In the United 
States, for example, 48 percent of assessed rivers and streams, 
60 percent of assessed lakes, reservoirs, and ponds, and 61 
percent of assessed estuaries were threatened or impaired 
for their designated uses in 2006. A signifi cant number were 
impaired by nutrients.1 
Globally, approximately 532 coastal areas around the world 
have been identifi ed as experiencing some form of eutrophica-
tion, or nutrient overenrichment. Of these, at least 405 coastal 
areas experience hypoxia (oxygen depletion).2 Eutrophication 
affects the ability of lakes, rivers, streams, and estuaries to 
support aquatic life and provide suitable drinking water. It can 
also lead to the formation of hypoxic areas or “dead zones” in 
lakes and coastal areas such as the Black Sea (Eastern Europe), 
Pearl River Delta (China), the Gulf of Mexico (U.S.), and the 
Chesapeake Bay (U.S.). 
Sources of water quality impairment are generally divided 
into two categories: point sources and nonpoint sources. Point 
sources are those sources that discharge pollutants into a 
waterbody via a discrete conveyance such as a pipe. Examples 
of point sources include sewage treatment plants and indus-
trial facilities. By contrast, pollution from nonpoint sources 
is typically diffuse in nature, such as agricultural or urban 
runoff. Because the precise origin of pollution from nonpoint 
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sources is diffi cult to identify, these sources are frequently not 
regulated for pollutant discharges.3 
To address the increasing occurrence of eutrophication in lo-
cal waterbodies, some government agencies are beginning to 
implement nutrient caps or limits for sources that discharge 
nutrients in waterways. In some cases, water quality trading 
is being proposed to reduce the costs associated with meet-
ing nutrient caps, as well as to offset additional nutrient dis-
charges that may result from urban or agricultural productivity 
growth. 
While some jurisdictions are experimenting with water qual-
ity trading as a means of reducing the costs associated with 
restoring and protecting water quality, the potential effi cien-
cies from trading programs can only be realized if programs 
are appropriately structured and implemented. The purpose 
of this brief is to provide an overview of water quality trading 
programs, outline the various approaches to program design, 
and explore the program design elements that are important 
for implementing effective water quality trading programs. We 
use stakeholder satisfaction, trading activity, and ability to meet 
the environmental goal as our measures for an effective trading 
program. However, we do recognize that in many instances 
programs have not been operating long enough to adequately 
assess progress toward environmental goals or the ability of 
programs to continue meeting these goals in the long term.
What is Water Quality Trading?
Water quality trading is a market-based instrument that is 
gaining popularity as a mechanism to cost-effectively meet 
water quality goals. It is premised on the fact that the costs to 
reduce pollution differ among individual entities depending on 
their size, location, scale, management, and overall effi ciency. 
Trading allows sources with high abatement costs to purchase 
pollution discharge reductions from sources that have lower 
abatement costs. Entities with lower abatement costs are able 
to economically lower their pollution discharges beyond regu-
lated or permitted levels, enabling them to sell their excess 
reductions to entities with higher costs. Water quality trading 
is most commonly applied to nutrients (such as nitrogen and 
phosphorus), but has also been applied to temperature, sele-
nium, and sediment.4
Water quality trading has many formulations. Trades between 
regulated point sources—that is, two sewage treatment plants 
trading to meet permitted discharge levels—are the most 
straightforward. The Long Island Sound Nitrogen Credit 
Exchange Program (Connecticut, U.S.) is an example of such 
a point-to-point-source trading program. Water quality trad-
ing programs can also allow trading between regulated point 
sources and unregulated nonpoint sources, such as agriculture. 
Trading between point and nonpoint sources enables point 
sources with high compliance costs to purchase pollution re-
duction credits (also referred to as “offsets”) from nonpoint 
sources with lower pollution reduction costs. In most instances, 
point-source facilities are controlled by regulatory discharge 
permits—for example, the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) permits—while nonpoint sources are generally not 
controlled by regulatory discharge limits. In these types of 
programs, nonpoint sources are typically sellers of pollution 
reduction credits and not buyers, since they are under no 
regulatory obligation to reduce their discharge.
In some instances, trading programs are focused entirely on 
nonpoint sources. In these instances, one or both of the non-
point sources involved in the trades have been regulated. For 
example, the Lake Taupo Nitrogen Trading Program in New 
Zealand (under development) is allocating nitrogen discharge 
allowances to all agricultural sources within the Lake Taupo 
watershed. It will allow them to trade among each other to 
maintain compliance or to expand production.
Globally, the majority of nutrient pollution originates from 
nonpoint sources, principally agricultural sources. In the 
United States, approximately 82 percent of the nitrogen and 
84 percent of the phosphorus in U.S. lakes, rivers, and es-
tuaries come from nonpoint sources.5 Water quality trading 
programs that allow point-to-nonpoint trades may therefore 
be viewed as mechanisms for leveraging point-source regula-
tory requirements to generate reductions from unregulated 
nonpoint sources. The point-to-nonpoint trades also provide 
point sources with fl exibility in achieving their regulatory 
limits in a cost-effective manner, while providing incentives 
(in the form of additional revenue streams from credit sales) 
to nonpoint sources to reduce their pollution loads. Over 70 
percent of active water quality trading programs allow trades 
between point and nonpoint sources. 
Survey of Water Quality Trading Programs
In 2008, WRI undertook an assessment of water quality 
trading programs worldwide. We identifi ed 57 programs; of 
these, 26 are active,6 21 are under consideration or develop-
ment, and 10 are inactive. Of the programs identifi ed, all but 
six are located in the United States. (See Box 1 for a discus-
sion of the reasons why water quality trading has taken off in 
the United States.) The six trading programs that are not in 
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the United States include the Lake Taupo Nitrogen Trading 
Program (New Zealand; under development), Hunter River 
Salinity Trading Scheme (Australia; active), South Nation 
River Watershed Trading Program (Canada; active), South 
Creek Bubble Licensing Scheme (Australia; active), Murray-
Darling Basin Salinity Credits Scheme (Australia; active), and 
the Moreton Bay Nutrient Trading Scheme (Australia; under 
development). Table 1 provides a list and brief profi le of the 
trading programs evaluated.
In addition, we identifi ed 13 statewide water quality trading 
guidance, policies, or rules that exist or are in development in 
the United States. These include: 
• Colorado Pollutant Trading Policy (inactive),
• Connecticut Water Quality Trading Legislation,
• Delaware State Trading Initiatives (under development),
• Florida Water Quality Trading Rules (under development),
• Idaho Pollutant Trading Guidance,
• Maryland State Water Quality Trading Policy (under 
development),
• Michigan Water Quality Trading Rules,
• Minnesota Water Quality Trading Policy (under develop-
ment),
• Ohio Water Quality Trading Rules,
• Oregon Final Internal Management Directive of Water 
Quality Trading,
• Pennsylvania State Water Quality Trading Policy,
• Virginia State Water Quality Trading Rules,
• West Virginia Water Quality Trading Guidance (under 
development), and
• Georgia Water Quality Trading Initiatives (under develop-
ment).
 
Comparing Water Quality Trading Programs
We compared water quality trading programs along seven 
dimensions—policy drivers, allocation of caps, establishment 
of nonpoint-source baselines, nonpoint-source nutrient reduc-
tion calculations, use of trading ratios, market structure, and 
trading activity. Our comparison is based on literature research 
and phone interviews with water quality trading program rep-
resentatives. In addition, we conducted in-person interviews 
with a variety of stakeholders involved with the eight trading 
programs listed below. 
• Cherry Creek Reservoir Watershed Phosphorus Trading 
Program, Colorado
• Chatfi eld Reservoir Trading Program, Colorado
• Long Island Sound Nitrogen Credit Exchange Program, 
Connecticut
• Great Miami River Watershed Trading Pilot, Ohio
• Pennsylvania Water Quality Trading Program, 
Pennsylvania
• Red Cedar River Nutrient Trading Pilot Program, 
Wisconsin
• South Nation River Watershed Trading Program, Ontario, 
Canada
• Lake Taupo Nitrogen Trading Program, New Zealand
The majority of the water quality trading programs identifi ed by 
WRI were located in the United States. Three factors have helped 
spur the proliferation of water quality trading programs in the 
United States:
• Increased regulatory interest in controlling nutrients as a result 
of increasing occurrences of eutrophication and hypoxia in U.S. 
waterbodies. In the late 1990s, the enforcement of the Clean Wa-
ter Act’s (CWA) total maximum daily load (TMDL) requirement 
began in earnest. As a result of the enforcement of this provi-
sion, there was a proliferation of nutrient-based TMDLs. Point 
sources within nutrient-impaired TMDL watersheds are assigned 
permits, which limit their nutrient discharges to the waterbody.  
• The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) endorsement 
of water quality trading. In 2003, EPA released its Water Quality 
Trading Policy, which encouraged the use of water quality trading 
to achieve watershed goals. More specifi cally, the policy was in-
tended to encourage voluntary trading programs to facilitate the 
implementation of TMDLs, reduce the costs of complying with 
CWA regulations, establish incentives for voluntary reductions, 
and promote watershed-based initiatives. (See EPA’s  “Final Wa-
ter Quality Trading Policy” available online at: http: //www.epa.
gov/owow/watershed/trading/fi nalpolicy2003.html.)  
• Availability of government funding to fi nance market-based water 
quality initiatives. EPA, together with the United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture (USDA), encouraged the implementation of 
water quality trading programs through grant funding. Three of 
the primary funding sources for developing water quality trading 
programs include EPA’s Targeted Watershed Grant and Section 
319 grants, and the Conservation Innovation Grants Program 
authorized under the 2002 Farm Bill and funded through the 
USDA’s Natural Resource Conservation Service (USDA-NRCS). 
These grants provide the resources to cover program start-up 
costs and fund any initial scoping or communication activities. 
BOX 1 Water Quality Trading in the United States
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Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme* New South Wales, 
Australia
PS-PS Exchange market
South Nation River Watershed Trading Program * Ontario, Canada PS-NPS Clearinghouse




Murray-Darling Basin Salinity Credits Scheme† Southeastern Australia Bilateral
Grassland Area Farmers Tradable Loads Program* California, U.S. NPS-NPS Bilateral
Bear Creek* Colorado, U.S. PS-PS/NPS Bilateral
Chatfi eld Reservoir Trading Program* Colorado, U.S. PS-PS/NPS Sole-source offsets
Cherry Creek Reservoir Watershed Phosphorus Trading 
Program*
Colorado, U.S. PS-PS/NPS Sole-source offsets
Lake Dillon (Dillon Reservoir) Trading Program* Colorado, U.S. PS-NPS Bilateral
Long Island Sound Nitrogen Credit Exchange Program* Connecticut, U.S. PS-PS Clearinghouse 
Delaware Inland Bays* Delaware, U.S. PS-NPS Sole-source offsets
Lower Boise River Effl uent Trading Demonstration Project Idaho, U.S. PS-NPS Bilateral
Middle Snake River Demonstration Project Idaho, U.S. PS-PS Bilateral
Minnesota River Basin Trading Program* Minnesota, U.S. PS-PS Bilateral
Rahr Malting* Minnesota, U.S. PS-NPS Bilateral
Southern Minnesota Beet Sugar Cooperative Program* Minnesota, U.S. PS-NPS Clearinghouse
Las Vegas Wash Nevada, U.S. PS-PS Clearinghouse  
(aggregate permit)
Taos Ski Valley New Mexico, U.S. PS-NPS Sole-source offsets
Neuse River Basin Total Nitrogen Trading Program* North Carolina, U.S. PS-PS/NPS Clearinghouse 
(bubble permit)
Tar-Pamlico Nutrient Trading Program* North Carolina, U.S. PS-PS/NPS Clearinghouse
Great Miami River Watershed Trading Pilot Ohio, U.S. PS-PS/NPS Clearinghouse
Alpine Cheese Company/Sugar Creek* Ohio, U.S. PS-NPS Bilateral
Clean Water Services/Tualatin River* Oregon, U.S. PS-PS/NPS Bilateral, 
Sole-source offsets
Pennsylvania Water Quality Trading Program* Pennsylvania, U.S. PS-PS/NPS Exchange market
Virginia Water Quality Trading Program Virginia, U.S. PS-PS/NPS Clearinghouse/ 
Bilateral
Red Cedar River Nutrient Trading Pilot Program* Wisconsin, U.S. PS-NPS Bilateral
Programs/Initiatives In Development or Under Consideration
Moreton Bay Nutrient Trading Scheme Queensland, Australia TBD TBD
Lake Taupo Nitrogen Trading Program New Zealand NPS-NPS TBD
Lower Colorado River Basin Colorado, U.S. TBD TBD
Florida Ranchlands Environmental Services Project Florida, U.S. NPS-NPS TBD
Lake Allatoona Georgia, U.S. PS-PS or PS-PS/
NPS
TBD
Maryland Water Quality Trading Program Maryland, U.S. PS-NPS Exchange Market
Massachusetts Estuaries Project Massachusetts, U.S. PS-NPS TBD
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These programs were selected because they represented a 
diverse cross-section of different market structures, different 
scales, different participants, different commodities, differing 
lengths of time since establishment, and differing levels of 
trading activity. See Box 2 for brief descriptions of the water 
quality trading programs that WRI selected for interviews.
1. Policy Drivers 
The primary policy driver for all water quality trading programs 
has been the implementation or forthcoming implementation 
of nutrient caps that limit pollutant discharges. In the United 
States, the Clean Water Act (CWA) provides the foundation 
for point-source nutrient caps. The law requires states to adopt 
water quality standards for various pollutants. Violation of these 
standards may result in a total maximum daily load (TMDL) 




Charles River Flow Trading Program Massachusetts, U.S. PS-PS Bilateral
Kalamazoo: Gun Lake Tribe Trading Initiative Michigan, U.S. PS-NPS Exchange market
Upper Mississippi River Basin Minnesota, U.S. PS-NPS Clearinghouse
Vermillion River Minnesota, U.S. TBD TBD
Cape Fear North Carolina, U.S. PS-NPS TBD
Passaic River New Jersey, U.S. PS-PS/NPS TBD
Lake Tahoe Nevada, U.S. NPS-NPS TBD
Truckee River Water Quality Settlement Agreement Nevada, U.S. PS-NPS TBD
Shepherd Creek Ohio, U.S. PS-NPS Clearinghouse
Upper Little Miami River Basin Ohio, U.S. PS-NPS TBD
Portland Tradable Stormwater Credit Initiative Oregon, U.S. PS-PS TBD
Willamette Partnership Oregon, U.S. TBD TBD
Bear River Idaho/Utah/Wyoming, 
U.S.
TBD TBD
West Virginia Potomac Water Quality Bank and Trade Pilot West Virginia, U.S. PS-PS/NPS Exchange market
Inactive Trading Programs/Completed Pilot or Demonstration Programs
Clear Creek* Colorado, U.S. PS-PS1 Sole-source offsets
Boulder Creek Trading Program* Colorado, U.S. PS-NPS Sole-source offsets
Upper Maquoketa and South Fork Maquoketa Watersheds 
Nutrient Trading Directory*
Iowa, U.S. NPS-NPS Bilateral 
Sudbury River (Wayland Center)* Massachusetts, U.S. PS-PS Bilateral 
Kalamazoo River Michigan, U.S. PS-NPS Clearinghouse
Passaic Valley Sewerage Commission Pretreatment Trading* New Jersey, U.S. PS-PS Bilateral 
New York City Watershed Phosphorus Offset Pilot Programs* New York, U.S. PS-PS Sole-source offsets
Lake Champlain* New York/ Vermont, U.S. PS-PS Sole-source offsets
Fox-Wolf Basin Wisconsin, U.S. PS-NPS Bilateral 
Rock River Wisconsin, U.S. PS-NPS Bilateral 
Notes 
NPS = nonpoint source; PS = point source; TBD = to be determined
§ Market types are described in the market structure section later.
* Program has had at least one trade or offset.
† This program differs from others as the salinity credits are held by the Australian states that are part of the program, not individual sources.
1.  In the Clear Creek program, a mining company fi nanced clean-up efforts at an abandoned mine. Mines are “orphan” sources. They are not 
permitted, not owned by an individual, and are diffi cult to monitor, but are similar to point sources because they are one central source of pol-
lutant discharge.
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being developed for the waterbody. A TMDL defi nes the 
maximum amount of a pollutant that can be discharged into a 
waterbody, yet still maintain water quality standards. During 
the TMDL development process, pollutant loads are allocated 
among the various sources in a watershed (point and nonpoint), 
so that water quality standards can be met. The pollutant limit 
allocated to point sources under a TMDL, or “wasteload al-
location,” forms the basis of a water quality-based effl uent 
limit that is placed in a regulated facility’s NPDES permit. 
These permit limits—or threat of permit limits—have driven 
the development of a large number of water quality trading 
programs in the United States. 
Local and regional pollution caps have been the driver for 
trading in other countries as well as for some of the trading pro-
grams in the United States. Under the Resource Management 
Act, which grants regional governments in New Zealand the 
authority to make resource management decisions, the Waikato 
Regional Council has imposed nitrogen discharge caps on all 
sources in the Lake Taupo catchment. The Provincial Ministry 
of Environment (MOE) guidelines are the driver for the South 
Nation River Watershed Trading Program in Ontario, Canada. 
MOE is responsible for water quality and sewage treatment 
plant licensing in Ontario. It stipulates that if water quality 
Cherry Creek and Chatfi eld Reservoir Trading 
Programs, Colorado, U.S.
The Cherry Creek and Chatfi eld reservoirs are both subject to a state-
imposed Total Maximum Annual Load (TMAL) that limits the amount 
of phosphorus that can be discharged into the reservoir by both point 
and nonpoint sources. There are fi ve point sources that discharge to 
the Cherry Creek reservoir and 12 point sources that discharge to the 
Chatfi eld reservoir. To meet short-term credit demand (for example, 
upset conditions at a treatment facility that cause the facility to exceed 
its permit), regulated point sources are allowed to purchase credits 
from other regulated point sources or from the Watershed Authorities’ 
Reserve Fund which has established long-term credit-generating proj-
ects. For credits needed to offset new or expanding facilities, facilities 
must generate credits through the implementation of urban nonpoint 
source projects that reduce phosphorus loads to the reservoir. While 
most regulated facilities have been discharging below their allowable 
loads, a few trades have occurred: four trades in Cherry Creek and 
seven trades in Chatfi eld. 
Long Island Sound Nitrogen Credit Exchange Program, 
Connecticut, U.S. 
In 2001 a TMDL for dissolved oxygen was implemented for the 
Long Island Sound. As a result, point sources were given caps for 
total nitrogen discharges; in total there are 79 point sources that 
trade in the Long Island Sound program. The nitrogen cap alloca-
tions were distributed to each facility depending on discharge vol-
ume, with allocations decreasing every year or every other year. Any 
new facilities must purchase credits to offset 100 percent of their 
discharge (though there have been no new facilities since incep-
tion of the program). In 2002 the Connecticut legislature created a 
Nitrogen Credit Exchange (NCE) that is overseen by the Nitrogen 
Credit Advisory Board. One of the principal roles of the Nitrogen 
Credit Advisory Board is to determine the price of a nitrogen credit. 
Credit trading occurs once yearly after the close of the permit year. 
To date nearly 12 million credits have been bought and sold on the 
NCE for a total value of nearly $30 million. 
Great Miami Water Quality Credit Trading Program, 
Ohio, U.S.
A TMDL is in place for one of three subwatersheds in the Great 
Miami, and TMDLs are under development for the remaining two. 
The TMDLs are expected to result in strict phosphorus discharge 
limits for regulated facilities. The Great Miami pilot began in 2006 
and seeks to encourage facilities under threat of regulation to be early 
actors by purchasing phosphorus credits before permit limits are 
enacted. The Water Conservation Subdistrict of the Miami Conser-
vancy District has led the pilot and acted as a credit bank or clear-
inghouse. The credit bank was capitalized with money from grants 
as well as money from point sources wishing to purchase credits. To 
obtain credits, the Miami Conservancy District issued a request for 
proposals to generate agricultural credits. Soil and Water Conserva-
tion Districts in the area worked with farmers to submit applications 
for credit generation. Once applications were received, the Miami 
Conservancy District held a reverse auction to select and fund those 
applications that provided the greatest phosphorus reductions at the 
least cost. Credits were then allocated to investors based on their ini-
tial investment amount. To date, the Miami Conservancy District has 
held four rounds of reverse auctions to purchase phosphorus credits. 
A total of 50 projects have been funded, with payments totaling 
$923,069. The projects have produced 324 tons in phosphorus reduc-
tions. (Hall, D. and S. Hippensteel. 2008. “Benefi ts and Obstacles to 
Trading.” CTIC Workshop, Troy, Ohio.)
Pennsylvania Water Quality Trading Program, 
Pennsylvania, U.S.
Under the Chesapeake Bay Agreement, Pennsylvania must reduce 
nitrogen and phosphorus loads to the Chesapeake Bay by 2010, or 
a TMDL will be developed for the watershed. Beginning in 2010, 
Pennsylvania plans to issue nitrogen and phosphorus discharge limits 
for permitted facilities. These permit limits will affect 183 permitted 
dischargers in Pennsylvania’s Potomac and Susquehanna watersheds. 
In addition, new and expanding facilities of any size will be required 
to offset 100 percent of nitrogen and phosphorus discharges. 
BOX 2 Selected Water Quality Trading Programs
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guidelines are exceeded, then no new pollutant discharge is 
allowed in a watershed.7 
In Australia, the Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme in 
New South Wales is driven by salinity concerns for the Hunter 
River. To address these concerns, the New South Wales En-
vironmental Protection Agency (NSW EPA) set a numeric 
salinity goal for the river, with the major point sources holding 
an Environmental Protection License to discharge.8 Similarly, 
NSW EPA created a total pollutant load limit for nutrients in 
South Creek and allowed the affected sewage treatment plants 
to trade in order to stay within that limit.9 
2. Allocation of Water Quality Caps
Once a watershed water quality cap has been established, the 
cap has to be allocated among all regulated entities. Pollutant 
caps for point sources are generally allocated based on regula-
tory numeric effl uent concentration limits for a given pollutant. 
To facilitate trading, effl uent pollutant concentration limits are 
often translated into an annual discharge limit expressed as a 
unit of mass over time (for example, pounds per year). The an-
nual discharge limit is based on the numeric effl uent concentra-
tion limit and an annual facility fl ow volume. In many instances, 
the fl ow volume used to determine the annual discharge limit 
is equal to the facility’s annual average design fl ow. A sewage 
In anticipation of these permit limits, Pennsylvania issued water 
quality trading guidance in 2006. Pennsylvania’s guidance allows 
for point-to-point and point-to-nonpoint trades. To date, five 
point-to-nonpoint trades have been completed and approved 
though the actual exchange of credits will not take place until 
2010 when permit limits are in place. Most of the nitrogen and 
phosphorus credits generated thus far have been generated 
through manure export projects where the landowner agrees to 
export manure generated on his or her agricultural operation to 
nutrient-poor abandoned mine lands. Pennsylvania is structured 
as an exchange market where credit prices are determined by the 
market. While Pennsylvania has implemented an online market-
place to facilitate trades, all trades to date have been transacted 
through private bilateral negotiations.
Red Cedar River Trading Program, Wisconsin, U.S.
The City of Cumberland wastewater treatment facility faced a total 
phosphorus limit of 1 mg/l and elected to meet this cap through trad-
ing with agricultural nonpoint sources. The City of Cumberland was 
required to obtain 4,400 pounds of phosphorus credits per year in 
order to meet its discharge permit. The City of Cumberland worked 
with the Barron County Land Conservation District to identify and 
enroll farmers that were willing to generate phosphorus reductions 
through the implementation of no-till or conservation tillage practices 
on their operations for a period of three years. The credit payments 
that participating farmers receive from the City of Cumberland are 
equal to the incentive payments they would have received from 
the federal cost-share programs. The number of credits generated 
through these practices has been pre-determined using average soil 
loss values and soil phosphorus concentrations. The fi rst trades took 
place in 2001, and to date there have been eight rounds of credit 
purchases.
South Nation Total Phosphorus Management Program, 
Ontario, Canada
The South Nation Conservation Association (SNCA) runs a phospho-
rous management program that allows 15 municipal and two indus-
trial dairy wastewater treatment plants to comply with federal load 
limits for the South Nation River. Under the “Policy 2” requirement 
established by the Canadian Ministry of the Environment, no new 
construction that could increase total phosphorous discharge may oc-
cur because the South Nation River exceeds water quality guidelines.
SNCA has established a Clean Water Committee comprised of 
agriculture and point source representatives to manage the Clean 
Water Fund (Fund). The Fund allocates money to farmers to pay for 
BMPs that generate credits. Point sources may purchase credits from 
the Fund to offset their increased phosphorous discharge, and sale 
revenue is used to replenish the fund.
Lake Taupo Trading Program, Waikato, New Zealand
Lake Taupo in New Zealand is located in a primarily agricultural water-
shed. Under the Resource Management Act, Environment Waikato (the 
regional council with regulatory authority) has capped the amount of ni-
trogen entering the lake. Each land use and hectare of land in the Lake 
Taupo watershed will have a nitrogen discharge limit. The benchmark 
(or initial allowance allocation) for agricultural sources is based on 
the average nitrogen losses between 2000 and 2005. There is a goal 
to reduce nitrogen losses to Lake Taupo by 20 percent. However, the 
trading program, which focuses on agricultural sources, is aimed at 
maintaining water quality at 2001 levels. Any landowners wishing to 
increase their nitrogen discharge will need to purchase allowances from 
other landowners in the watershed. A separate fund, The Lake Taupo 
Protection Trust, has the mandate to achieve the permanent 20 percent 
reduction in nitrogen entering the lake. They are likely to achieve this 
through a mix of land retirement, land conversion, and purchasing 
allowances that result in permanent reductions of nitrogen. The Lake 
Taupo program has been under development for the past 7 years and 
will allow trading once agricultural sources have been benchmarked.
BOX 2 continued
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treatment plant, for example, that has an annual discharge limit 
based on a nitrogen concentration of 6 mg/l and a design fl ow of 
20 million gallons per day (mgd) would be allowed to discharge 
a total of 365,292 pounds of nitrogen per year.10 
Because most discharge limits are allocated based on design 
rather than actual fl ows, many point sources have not been in 
danger of exceeding their permitted limit in the short term, as 
they operate below their maximum capacity. In our example, if 
a treatment plant has a current fl ow of 14 mgd and a current ni-
trogen concentration of 8 mg/l, it would discharge approximately 
340,939 pounds of nitrogen per year—which is under its annual 
discharge limit of 365,292 pounds of nitrogen per year (a limit 
that was based on design fl ow of 20 mgd and a nitrogen concentra-
tion limit of 6 mg/l). In many water quality trading programs (for 
example, Cherry Creek and Chatfi eld Reservoir trading programs 
in Colorado, U.S.), increases in urban growth—which translate 
to greater fl ow rates—is the main factor threatening the ability 
of sewage treatment plants to meet their discharge limits. 
In some cases, such as the South Creek Bubble Licensing 
Scheme and Tar-Pamlico Nutrient Trading Program, the point 
sources involved must meet the cap in aggregate, and there is 
no allocation to the individual sources. This type of voluntary 
grouping of point sources for the purpose of meeting a cap is 
generally referred to as a “trading association.” These associa-
tions often consist of multiple facilities grouped together under 
a single aggregate permit and are generally free to choose 
whatever means they prefer to achieve the cap. 
However, many water quality trading programs have not yet 
allocated water quality caps for the pollutants of concern to 
the regulated sources. For example, the Middle Snake River 
Demonstration Project in Idaho was developed in anticipation 
of a TMDL for phosphorus, but the TMDL has yet to be fi nal-
ized. As a result, point source regulatory caps for phosphorus 
have not been enacted or allocated. Other active programs 
where there has been no allocation of individual caps to sources 
include the Lower Boise River Effl uent Trading Demonstration 
Project and the Great Miami River Watershed Trading Pilot. 
In addition, many of the programs under development are also 
awaiting fi nalization of a TMDL or relevant legislation and/or 
allocation of water quality caps. Until these caps are allocated, 
trading is unlikely to occur. 
3. Establishment of Nonpoint Source Baselines
As nonpoint sources are typically not regulated, their baseline 
nutrient discharges have to be established before they are able 
to generate and trade any nutrient reduction credits. Estab-
lishing baselines is critical to ensure that credits generated by 
nonpoint sources are “additional” water quality improvements 
that would not otherwise have taken place. For agricultural 
nonpoint sources, baselines are frequently either a cut-off 
date for eligible activities that reduce pollutant loadings—for 
example, a program might stipulate that no practices installed 
before 2007 are eligible to generate credits—or a performance 
standard, where a program might stipulate that a farm must 
implement a certain suite of practices or achieve a certain level of 
environmental performance before they are eligible to generate 
credits. Virginia, for example, established a performance-based 
baseline for agriculture requiring farmers to implement riparian 
buffers, streambank fencing, cover crops, and no-till agriculture 
before subsequent activities that reduce pollution are eligible 
to generate credits that can be used in Virginia’s trading pro-
gram. Similarly, the Maryland program (under development) is 
considering a performance-based baseline for agriculture that is 
expressed as a numeric per acre nutrient load that a farm must 
achieve before being able to generate credits. In the Lake Taupo 
Nitrogen Trading Program, nitrogen discharge permits will be 
allocated to each farm based on their highest annual discharge 
between July 2001 and June 2005. Choosing the highest year 
during this period allows for the variation in nitrogen discharges 
related to weather conditions to be taken into account.
4. Nonpoint-Source Nutrient Loss and Reductions 
Calculations 
Because current nutrient losses and thus reductions in nutrient 
losses from nonpoint sources are diffi cult to measure, program 
designers have to identify the measurement or estimation ap-
proach they will use to determine the nutrient losses and reduc-
tions from these sources. Three common approaches are:
• Direct measurement through monitoring. This ap-
proach uses direct measurements based on in-fi eld 
samples to determine the nutrient reductions that result 
from the implementation of a control measure. While this 
approach is potentially the most accurate, it is also costly 
and is not readily applicable to all sources of nutrients or 
actions that reduce nutrient losses. The diffuse nature of 
agricultural nutrient pollution means that most agricul-
tural best management practices (BMPs) are not readily 
monitored. The Chatfi eld Reservoir Trading Program in 
Colorado requires regulated point sources to monitor the 
performance of the practices implemented to offset their 
nutrient discharge. The initial estimated number of cred-
its that the project receives is then adjusted up or down 
once monitoring data is available. The Lower Boise River 
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Effl uent Trading Demonstration Project (Idaho, U.S.) 
does not require monitoring, but provides incentives 
to directly measure nutrient reductions from BMPs on 
irrigated lands by lowering the uncertainty ratio (see the 
trading ratio section) and thus the discount rate applied 
to reductions from monitored projects. 
• Site-specifi c calculations. This approach uses established 
calculation methodologies to estimate nutrient losses and 
reductions from nonpoint sources, taking into account 
site-specifi c variables such as soil type, slope, and fertilizer 
application rate. The Pennsylvania Water Quality Trad-
ing Program, Maryland Water Quality Trading Program, 
Great Miami River Watershed Trading Pilot, Gun Lake 
Tribe Trading Initiative, and Lake Taupo Nitrogen Trad-
ing Program use this approach for estimating reductions. 
Some examples of tools that have been developed to es-
timate on-farm losses and reductions include the OVER-
SEER®11 program in New Zealand, the Nitrogen Trading 
Tool, the Region 5 model, and WRI’s NutrientNet in the 
United States (see Box 3). Site-specifi c calculations are 
typically more accurate than pre-determined levels of 
nutrient discharges (described below).
• Pre-determined nutrient reductions for practices re-
gardless of location or other site-specifi c characteristics. 
This approach assigns a pre-determined reduction credit 
for each practice based on an estimated average nutrient 
reduction. These credit values are generally derived from 
scientifi c literature or watershed-level modeling and do 
not change across the watershed or region. The Red Cedar 
River Nutrient Trading Pilot Program, for example, uses 
average erosion rates and phosphorus soil concentrations 
to assign a phosphorus reduction of 12 pounds per acre per 
year for converting from conventional tillage to no-till and 
8 pounds per acre per year for converting to conservation 
tillage. The South Nation River Watershed Trading Pro-
gram and Virginia Water Quality Trading Program also use 
this approach. This is an appealing approach because it is 
simple to administer, and nonpoint source generators know 
in advance the reductions they can achieve for implement-
ing a practice. However, it reduces the ability to capitalize 
on the biophysical heterogeneity within a watershed, which 
limits the ability of a trading program to identify the most 
cost-effective activities for generating nutrient reductions. 
5. Trading Ratios 
Trading ratios are frequently used to account for a number 
factors in water quality trading programs such as uncertainty 
in reduction estimates (particularly for nonpoint-source reduc-
tions), creating equivalency among multiple pollutants, ensur-
ing overall water quality benefi ts, accounting for the effects of 
nutrient transport, and mitigating buyer risks. Trading ratios 
In the United States, several tools have been developed to estimate 
nutrient losses from farms for use in water quality trading programs. 
Nitrogen Trading Tool 
The USDA has begun development of the Nitrogen Trading Tool 
(NTT). The NTT is an online tool that allows users to calculate 
changes in nitrogen loss potential based on changes in crop man-
agement practices.  Users can assess how various BMPs may affect 
the nutrient losses from their farm, and calculate the total nitrogen 
reductions they can generate through changes in management prac-
tices. Although NTT is currently being developed only for nitrogen, 
the USDA hopes to adapt it to other pollutants such as phosphorus 
and sediment. The NTT is currently under development and is not 
yet used in any trading programs. The demonstration site can be 
accessed at http://199.133.175.80/nttwebax/.
Region 5 Load Estimation Spreadsheet Model
The U.S. EPA Region 5 spreadsheet model estimates pollutant 
reductions for (a) sediment; (b) sediment-borne phosphorus and 
nitrogen; (c) feedlot runoff; and (d) commercial fertilizer, pes-
ticides, and manure utilization. Unlike the NTT, which is based 
on a dynamic fi eld-level model, the Region 5 model is based on 
farm-level data inputs coupled with static equations that character-
ize relationships between fi eld-level practices and nutrient losses. 
While Region 5 has acknowledged the limitations of its tool, it does 
provide a uniform system of estimating relative pollutant loads. The 
Region 5 model is the standard used in the Michigan trading rules 
for estimating nonpoint source reductions and is also used in the 
Great Miami Watershed Trading Pilot. The spreadsheet model can 
be found at http://it.tetratech-ffx.com/stepl/.
NutrientNet
NutrientNet is an online application developed by the World 
Resources Institute that can be used to estimate nonpoint source 
reductions from agriculture. Like the Region 5 Load Estimation 
Spreadsheet Model, NutrientNet estimates nitrogen, phospho-
rus, and sediment losses from farms using farm-level data inputs. 
Unlike the NTT model and the Region 5 model, NutrientNet 
applies program-appropriate delivery factors and trading ratios to 
the edge-of-fi eld losses and reductions in order to calculate the 
actual number of credits generated through the implementation 
of best management practices. NutrientNet calculation tools have 
been developed for the Pennsylvania, Maryland, West Virginia, and 
Kalamazoo trading programs. NutrientNet can be found at www.
nutrientnet.org.
Box 3 Tools of the Trade: Estimating the reduction in
     nutrient losses from U.S. farms
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are applied to the estimated nutrient reductions to determine 
the saleable reduction credit. For instance, a 2:1 trading ratio 
means that an entity needs to purchase two pounds of pollutant 
reductions to offset every pound they discharge above their 
regulatory limit. Below are the types of ratios that are used in 
water quality trading programs: 
• Delivery ratio. Delivery ratios (also called “attenuation 
factors”) are ratios applied to point and nonpoint-source 
pollutant reductions to account for pollutant losses/at-
tenuation during transport in a watershed. Unlike carbon 
markets, where the location of pollutant discharges are 
not generally important, location is important in water 
quality markets. Physical, chemical, and biological pro-
cesses can diminish the effect of some pollutants—such 
as nutrients—as they move downstream. A pound of ni-
trogen or phosphorus reduced further upstream from the 
point of concern often has a smaller water quality benefi t 
than a pound of nitrogen or phosphorus reduced closer 
to the point of concern. Similarly, a pound of reduction 
close to a point of concern—such as a dead zone—can 
have a greater water quality benefi t than an upstream 
reduction occurring several miles from the point of con-
cern. In water quality trading programs, delivery ratios 
are used to estimate the percentage of nutrients and 
sediment ultimately delivered to a waterbody from a par-
ticular location within the watershed—such as a farm or 
sewage treatment plant discharge pipe—and the percent-
age that is “lost” or “attenuated” during transportation. 
 Applying a delivery ratio helps ensure equivalency be-
tween the water quality effect of a purchased credit and 
the purchaser’s nutrient discharge at the point of concern. 
This maintains the environmental integrity of the water 
quality trading program and provides fungibility between 
credits. Despite the importance of equivalency, many 
of the programs surveyed by WRI did not use delivery 
ratios. One reason for this omission was the diffi culty in 
determining an appropriate ratio. Most delivery ratios are 
determined using a watershed fate and transport model.12 
This is often beyond the capability of many programs due 
to the funding and knowledge needed to create such wa-
tershed models. The Chesapeake Bay Watershed Model, 
developed and maintained by the U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, models nutrient losses and transport from 
over 300 subwatersheds to the mouth of the Chesapeake 
Bay. All of the Chesapeake Bay state water quality trading 
programs—Pennsylvania, Virginia, Maryland and West 
Virginia—use these model-derived delivery factors, ap-
plying them to point source and nonpoint source nutrient 
discharges. The Minnesota River Basin Trading Program 
also uses model-derived delivery factors to convert reduc-
tions into “Jordan Trading Units,” which account for the 
attenuation of phosphorus from various points within the 
watershed to a monitoring point in Jordan, Minnesota. 
• Uncertainty ratio. Uncertainty ratios are used by water 
quality trading programs to compensate for two factors: 
(1) random variability in weather and other environmen-
tal factors that affect the effi cacy of pollution reduc-
tion measures (especially for nonpoint sources), and (2) 
uncertainty regarding effi ciency values used to estimate 
nonpoint-source reductions in nutrient losses. Uncertain-
ty ratios mean that credit buyers are required to purchase 
more reductions than they need to meet their regulatory 
obligation. Uncertainty ratios are often set at 2:1, though 
this varies among programs. We found no instances 
where uncertainty ratios were derived based on scientifi c 
or statistical information; rather these ratios were gener-
ally set at a value deemed suitably conservative, while 
remaining politically acceptable to stakeholders.
• Equivalency ratio. An equivalency ratio is used when 
two or more pollutants are traded in a market to achieve 
the same environmental result. Some pollutants contrib-
ute to the same environmental problem; however one 
pollutant may be more potent than another at produc-
ing the effect. An equivalency ratio is needed to make 
the two pollutants equivalent to one another. The Rahr 
Malting trade in Minnesota used an equivalency ratio. 
Rahr Malting’s discharge permit allows it to choose 
between reducing fi ve-day carbonaceous oxygen demand 
(CBOD5), phosphorus, nitrogen, or sediment loads to 
the receiving water. The Minnesota Pollution Control 
Agency established equivalency ratios between these four 
pollutants. The ratios are based on a scientifi c assessment 
of the relative impacts of these pollutants on chlorophyll 
levels in the river. For example, one pound of phosphorus 
has the same impact as eight pounds of CBOD5 and one 
pound of nitrogen the same as four pounds of phospho-
rus. Rahr Malting chose to meet its CBOD5 require-
ments by purchasing phosphorus offsets.
• Retirement ratio. When retirement ratios are used, a 
proportion of the credits are retired with each trade, 
resulting in net water quality benefi ts. Retirement ratios, 
or “environmental benefi t ratios,” are used to ensure 
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that the program achieves a net water quality benefi t 
beyond what can be achieved through regulation alone. 
For example, the Michigan Water Quality Trading Rules 
stipulate a 1:1.1 environmental benefi t ratio for point-
to-point trades. This means that 10 percent of all credits 
generated and sold by point sources are retired and 
cannot be used to offset new loads. Similarly, Maryland’s 
program (under development) will employ a fi ve percent 
retirement ratio for all point and nonpoint-source credits 
generated. 
• Insurance/Reserve ratio. An insurance or reserve ratio 
is used to set aside a portion of all generated credits into 
a reserve pool or insurance fund. A reserve ratio is used 
in the Pennsylvania Water Quality Trading Program and 
is being considered in the West Virginia Potomac Water 
Quality Bank and Trade Pilot as well. Pennsylvania ap-
plies a 10 percent reserve ratio to all generated credits. 
These credits are held in a centrally administered credit 
reserve fund and serve as insurance for regulated sources 
should any purchased credits default. In addition, Penn-
sylvania has pledged to also use the credit reserve to cre-
ate liquidity in the market when credit supplies are low. 
All or some of these trading ratios are used by most trading 
programs in the United States and Canada. Of the 26 active 
trading programs in the United States, 20 programs use some 
form of trading ratio; another is considering using trading ratios 
in the future. In many cases the trading ratio is not clearly de-
fi ned and actually represents a stacked ratio. The South Nation 
River Watershed Trading Program, for example, applies a 4:1 
trading ratio to all phosphorus reductions to compensate for 
delivery as well as uncertainty factors. 
6. Market Structure 
Market structure defi nes how trading will occur and the infra-
structure used to support the water quality trading program. 
The water quality trading programs reviewed by WRI have 
engaged in the following types of trading:13 
• Bilateral trades. Bilateral trades are characterized by 
one-on-one negotiations where a price is typically arrived 
at through a process of bargaining and not simply by 
observing a market price. This market structure gener-
ally has high transaction costs. Of the 26 active trading 
programs evaluated, 10 operate through bilateral negotia-
tions. The Virginia Water Quality Trading Program has a 
hybrid bilateral/clearinghouse market structure; the Tu-
alatin River program uses bilateral and sole-source offsets.
• Sole-source offsets. Sole-source offsets occur when 
sources are allowed to increase nutrient discharge at one 
point if they reduce their nutrient discharge elsewhere 
(either on-site or off-site). In both cases the nutrient 
reductions are undertaken by the regulated entity. Five 
active programs have this market structure, including the 
Cherry Creek Reservoir Watershed Phosphorus Trad-
ing Program, the Chatfi eld Reservoir Trading Program, 
Delaware Inland Bays, Taos Ski Valley, and the Tuala-
tin River Program. In the Chatfi eld Reservoir Trading 
Program, many of the trades involved offset projects that 
decommissioned septic systems and connected homes to 
a sewage treatment plant. The sewage treatment plant 
receives credits equivalent to the total amount of nutri-
ents retired through decommissioning the septic systems. 
Programs using sole-source offsets often involve a single 
offset project that can generate suffi cient credits for the 
duration of one or more permit cycles.14 
• Clearinghouse. A clearinghouse market is one where a 
single intermediary links buyers and sellers of credits. 
The clearinghouse converts a commodity that may have 
a variable price—such as a nutrient credit—into a uni-
form commodity. The clearinghouse market structure is 
used by nine of the active water quality trading programs, 
including the Virginia Water Quality Trading Program. 
Regulated facilities that need to purchase credits pay into 
a clearinghouse fund. The fund then purchases nutrient 
credits generated from reductions achieved either within 
the regulated community or from nonpoint sources outside 
the regulated community. This type of market structure 
can also be thought of as a “fee-in-lieu” system. A clearing-
house creates a simplifi ed market that regulated facilities 
may prefer since they avoid having to locate and purchase 
credits on their own, thereby lowering their transaction 
costs and mitigating their risk. This type of market struc-
ture works more effi ciently where there are a number of 
regulated entities and economies of scale can be achieved.
• Exchange market. An exchange market is where buyers 
and sellers meet in a public forum (for example, online) 
with all commodities being equivalent and all prices trans-
parent. An exchange is characterized by its open informa-
tion structure and fl uid transactions between buyers and 
sellers. The two active programs with exchange markets 
are the Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme and the 
Pennsylvania Water Quality Trading Program. Online 
marketplaces to facilitate exchange markets are also being 
developed or considered for the Gun Lake Tribe Trad-
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ing Initiative, Maryland’s trading program, and the West 
Virginia Potomac Water Quality Bank and Trade Pilot.
Third parties—such as brokers, aggregators, or credit banks 
(for example, an agricultural association)—are sometimes 
considered to constitute a distinct market structure. However, 
brokers, aggregators, and banks are in reality simply operators 
within the market. Regulated entities who wish to purchase 
nutrient credits can contract with a third party broker, aggrega-
tor, or bank to identify and purchase credits on their behalf. 
In practice, brokers, aggregators, and banks have typically 
worked within the agricultural sector as an entity that collects 
nutrient reduction credits and re-sells them to the regulated 
point source community. Some programs where third-party 
aggregators or banks have come to the fore include the Red 
Cedar River Nutrient Trading Pilot Program, Great Miami 
River Watershed Trading Pilot, Pennsylvania Water Quality 
Trading Program, Tualatin River program, and Alpine Cheese 
Company/Sugar Creek trade.
Some trading programs combine elements of several of these 
market structures. For example, the Virginia Water Quality 
Trading Program will use a combination of a clearinghouse 
and bilateral trades. Existing point sources that need to trade 
to meet their cap will trade within the Virginia Nutrient 
Credit Exchange Association, which is a clearinghouse run by 
the association of point sources. The Exchange will facilitate 
the identifi cation of available point-source credits and set 
credit prices. However, new or expanding facilities under the 
Virginia Water Quality Trading Program must obtain offsets 
from nonpoint sources.15 These credits must be located and 
purchased by the facility through a bilateral trade. If the facility 
is unable to locate credits, they are given the option of pay-
ing into the state Water Quality Improvement Fund (WQIF). 
The WQIF will be administered by the Virginia Department 
of Environmental Quality, and will be tasked with banking 
nonpoint-source credits and will sell credits to point sources 
that are unable to locate their own offsets for a set fee.
As water quality trading becomes more widespread, we can 
expect to see a variety of new, innovative market structures 
emerge. 
7. Trading Activity
Most active programs reviewed have experienced at least one 
trade. According to the U.S. EPA, in 2006 there were a total 
of 236 point source facilities in the United States covered by 
permits that allowed trades. Of these, 121 facilities had traded 
at least once over the life of the permit.16 Unfortunately, there 
is no accurate record of the total number of trades completed 
each year. Most U.S. facilities that were shown to have traded 
at least once over the life of their permit had completed only 
one trade; however, some have conducted many trades. For 
example, in the Tualatin River program, Clean Water Services 
acquired temperature credits from 25 different farmers who 
generated the credits by implementing riparian buffers on their 
property. The riparian buffers are expected to generate credits 
for 30 years, meaning that Clean Water Services will not have 
to acquire additional temperature credits until 2035 or until 
the regulatory conditions of their permit change. The Southern 
Minnesota Beet Sugar Cooperative trades were similar; they 
acquired credits from 256 of their cooperative farmers as a 
condition of their permit. In fact, it is expected that in most 
cases (especially those involving point-to-nonpoint trades) trad-
ing activity is unlikely to be continuous and ongoing, but rather 
involve single transactions that create credit streams of up to 10 
years or more. This is preferable, as regulated entities are likely 
to want the certainty of securing credits upfront for future com-
pliance periods, and sellers want continuous funding streams 
for the life of their water quality improvement practice. 
Of the active trading programs, only the Long Island Sound 
Nitrogen Credit Exchange Program in Connecticut and Hunter 
River Salinity Trading Scheme in Australia have experienced 
continuous trading activity since inception. The Hunter River 
Salinity Trading Scheme has conducted approximately 170 
trades since 2002, and the Long Island Sound Nitrogen Credit 
Exchange Program trades nearly one million credits per year. 
The Hunter River and Long Island Sound programs are the 
water quality trading programs that come closest to com-
moditizing water quality credits. In large part, this is possible 
because both of these programs are limited to trades between 
regulated point sources where there is considerable certainty 
in the value of the reductions and the certainty of delivery of 
those reductions. Second, these programs have a large num-
ber of regulated entities eligible to participate in the market, 
creating depth and fl uidity in the market. 
While many programs have experienced at least one trade, 
there are many that have yet to experience any trades. In 
many cases, the program was developed in anticipation of a 
regulatory driver that is not yet in place (for example, a per-
mit discharge limit for regulated sources), or the established 
regulatory limits did not necessitate trading (for example, the 
regulated facility is already operating below its regulatory 
limit and does not currently need to trade). The Great Miami 
River Watershed Trading Pilot, the Middle Snake River Dem-
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onstration Project, and Lower Boise River Effl uent Trading 
Demonstration Project are all programs that were developed 
in anticipation of a TMDL driver that has yet to be fi nalized. 
In the Gun Lake Tribe Trading Initiative, the TMDL is in 
place, but it is not suffi cient to create a demand for trading 
by the regulated point sources in the watershed. Absent or 
weak nutrient regulations—which in turn lead to little or no 
demand for credits by regulated sources—are often cited by 
experts as the foremost reason for little or no trading activity 
in water quality trading programs.17
Lessons Learned: Elements of effective 
water quality trading programs 
Much can be learned from existing and inactive trading pro-
grams, especially the elements and conditions that lead to 
programs with trading activity and/or stakeholder perceptions 
that the program is a viable means of meeting their regulatory 
obligations. These lessons should be considered and solutions 
incorporated into new or emerging water quality trading pro-
grams. The following elements emerged from our analysis as 
being important for the development of effective water quality 
trading programs.18  
Adequate drivers exist for pollutant reductions. We found that 
many water quality trading programs were developed in an-
ticipation of regulatory caps that never materialized, or the 
regulatory requirements ultimately proved too weak (that is, 
nutrient caps were set at a level that did not create suffi cient 
demand for trading). As a result, these programs experienced 
little or no trading. The Lower Boise River Effl uent Trading 
Demonstration Project is an example of a water quality trad-
ing program that was developed in anticipation of a TMDL 
that has yet to be fi nalized. The water quality trading program 
was fi nalized in 2002 but has sat idle for the past six years. In 
contrast, water quality trading programs in the Chesapeake 
Bay states (Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and West Vir-
ginia) are being developed in conjunction with newly adopted 
water quality standards. These standards have been translated 
into nutrient limits in point-source discharge permits. These 
meaningful nutrient limits have meant that trades have already 
occurred in the watershed, despite these programs being rela-
tively young. Our recommendation is that before spending the 
time and money to develop a water quality trading program, 
ascertain whether regulatory requirements or voluntary mo-
tives are likely to generate the demand for credits.
Potential risks to the regulated community are adequately ad-
dressed. Because of the potential for costly CWA enforcement 
actions for permit violations, regulated point sources in the 
United States are generally risk-averse. Frequently, when 
faced with regulatory limits, point source entities express a 
preference for costly upgrades that they can control, rather 
than being exposed to risks associated with purchasing credits 
from other parties, either point or nonpoint source, in a trading 
market. Under the CWA, a regulated point source purchasing 
credits from another regulated point source can transfer regu-
latory compliance liability to the seller. However, a regulated 
point source purchasing credits from an unregulated nonpoint 
source cannot transfer legal liability. This creates the risk that 
a regulated point source buyer would be held in violation of 
his permit should the contract with the unregulated entity 
default. While the contract between the buyer and seller 
could protect the buyer fi nancially in this event, it does not 
preclude enforcement action from the regulatory agency, nor 
the public disapprobation that goes with it. This legal reality 
makes the purchase of nonpoint-source credits too risky for 
some regulated sources. 
Purchasing credits from nonpoint sources also holds other 
risks for regulated point sources. In most instances, regulated 
facilities are looking for long-term supplies of credits in order 
to sustain new or expanded operational capacity. However, 
the supply of nonpoint-source credits, especially those from 
agriculture, is variable and can depend on annual management 
decisions made by farmers. In addition, farmers are often 
unable to guarantee a supply of credits over a long period of 
time due to the nature and duration of typical on-farm nutrient 
management practices. 
WRI identifi ed a number of ways of addressing this risk, 
including:
• Allowing and encouraging aggregators to operate 
within the market. Aggregators are entities that pur-
chase credits (generally large quantities of nonpoint 
source credits) to re-sell them to interested buyers. By 
introducing an aggregator, the direct liability link be-
tween the regulated entity and the unregulated nonpoint-
source entity is severed. Because an aggregator deals with 
large portfolios of credits, it can more easily mitigate risks 
associated with delivery and performance of nonpoint-
source credits. For example, an aggregator might sell only 
a portion of its credit portfolio and keep the remainder 
in reserve should one or more of the credit-generating 
projects fail or are not implemented as promised. 
• Creating credit reserves. Pennsylvania’s water quality 
trading program has created a centrally administered 
credit reserve to mitigate risks for regulated buyers. This 
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credit reserve effectively guarantees that a buyer who 
acts in good faith to secure credits will be able to draw 
from the reserve should his purchased credits default at 
the end of the compliance year. Similarly, Virginia’s trad-
ing statute stipulates that credits will be available from 
the state if there are shortfalls in the market or credits 
default. If a buyer is not able to locate credits at reason-
able cost within its watershed, it can buy them from the 
Virginia Water Quality Improvement Fund.
• Creating reconciliation periods. Because sewage treat-
ment plants are subject to periodic “upset conditions” (for 
example, unexpected disruptions of the treatment process 
from variations in temperature, fl ow, and nutrient con-
centration levels), regulated sources cannot predict with 
absolute certainty the number of credits they will need 
to buy—or conversely, how many they might be able to 
sell—in a given compliance period. Some programs have 
created reconciliation periods at the end of the annual 
compliance period to allow regulated facilities suffi cient 
time to either purchase credits to make up for any short-
falls or place excess credits on the market. These reconcil-
iation periods work hand-in-hand with the credit reserves.
Standardized estimations of nonpoint-source emissions and 
reductions are developed. Determining pollutant reductions 
from nonpoint sources represents a considerable challenge 
for water quality trading markets. Generally, pollutant loads 
and reductions from the implementation of nonpoint-source 
pollution abatement measures are not practical to measure 
directly and are, therefore, estimated. It is important that 
estimation methodologies used to calculate the reductions 
from nonpoint sources are defensible from a scientifi c and 
regulatory perspective. 
Methodologies to estimate the reduction in nutrient losses 
from agricultural practices can be time-consuming to develop, 
but much can be learned from the experiences of existing and 
emerging programs. In the United States, some trading pro-
grams use spreadsheet-based tools that incorporate nationally 
available algorithms (for example, the Revised Universal Soil 
Loss Equation, which estimates sediment losses from farms). 
These are relatively straightforward to adapt to different wa-
tersheds. The Chesapeake Bay Program has incorporated a 
set of long-term average agricultural loading rates and BMP 
nutrient removal effi ciencies into its watershed model. New 
Zealand’s Crown Research Institute, AgResearch, has devel-
oped Overseer®, a nutrient budgeting model to facilitate the 
estimation of nitrogen and phosphorus losses from pastoral 
lands. This model is national in scope, enabling it to be used 
by any watershed in the country that may propose a trading 
program. Because of national similarities in data availability 
and farming practices, estimation algorithms may be more dif-
fi cult to transfer between countries, but they are most likely 
transferable within a country. 
Transaction costs within the trading program are minimized. 
There are many ways to streamline the trading process and re-
duce transaction costs within a trading program. For instance, 
developing standardized language in regulatory compliance 
documents, drafting model contracts for sale transactions, and 
streamlining processes to eliminate unnecessary delays are all 
important for improving the effi ciency of a trading program. 
Identifying and locating buyers and sellers within the market 
is one transaction cost common to many trading programs. In 
particular, point sources often fi nd it diffi cult to locate willing 
nonpoint-source credit sellers due to both thin markets—that 
is, few qualifi ed sellers—and the unfamiliarity of the non-
point source sector with trading markets. Aggregators can, in 
part, reduce these transaction costs. Aggregators are typically 
established entities within the nonpoint-source community—
for example, agricultural consultants or conservation district 
staff—and are well-placed to identify and purchase credits from 
nonpoint source sellers and resell these to point sources. By 
purchasing from an aggregator, a point-source entity eliminates 
the need to manage and police multiple contracts from a variety 
of sellers, thus reducing transaction costs for the buyer.
Tools such as online marketplaces and registry databases to track 
credits and trades can also help reduce transaction costs and may 
be easily transferable between trading programs. There should 
be little need to dramatically change the marketplaces and reg-
istries between watersheds and countries. The use of existing 
tools that provide a ready-made structure for markets and trans-
action processes can decrease the time and cost of developing, 
implementing, and administering the various aspects of a trading 
program. In collaboration with WRI, the Pennsylvania Water 
Quality Trading Program, West Virginia Potomac Water Quality 
Bank and Trade Pilot, Maryland Water Quality Trading Program, 
and the Gun Lake Tribe Trading Initiative have all developed 
(or are developing) an online trading tool called NutrientNet 
that will facilitate market transactions and the administration 
of the water quality trading program (see Box 4). 
Increasing standardization of water quality trading programs 
through the use of standard tools, marketplaces, registries, and 
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credit calculations may provide additional benefi ts beyond re-
ducing transaction costs. Increasing standardization will likely 
facilitate the future broadening of water quality markets where 
it makes sense. For example, states within the Chesapeake Bay 
(Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and West Virginia) share 
many commonalities in their established and developing trad-
ing programs, making it possible that in the future, interstate 
trading within major basins may be possible.
Program has buy-in from local government, the regulated commu-
nity, and other stakeholders within the watershed. A stakeholder 
process that complements the development of a water quality 
trading program is important for successful implementation. 
Often the lack of understanding about what water quality trad-
ing is—and is not—creates misconceptions and tensions during 
the development and implementation phase of a program. Early 
education and ongoing dialogue with relevant stakeholders on 
trading concepts and the goals of the trading program are nec-
essary to ensure that the development process runs smoothly 
and to create stakeholder buy-in and support. However, it is 
not necessary to “reinvent the wheel” when it comes to com-
municating trading concepts and creating elements of a trading 
program—to a large extent educational materials have already 
been developed or can be borrowed from existing programs.19 
The success of the stakeholder process will frequently depend 
on the process employed and the stakeholder personalities in-
volved. Identifying a “trading champion” can be useful in this 
context. A high-level elected offi cial—for example, a governor, 
head of an environmental agency, or a council chairperson—
can help motivate other high-level offi cials during the early 
stages of developing a trading program, while a local trading 
champion can generate enthusiasm for trading at the grassroots 
level and help push a trading program forward. Many of the 
programs in the United States that have languished have not 
had the support of important stakeholders. For example, with 
the encouragement of the director of the Michigan Offi ce of 
the Great Lakes and support from key staff members within 
Michigan’s Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), 
Michigan implemented state trading regulations in 2002, but 
support for trading diminished once the director and key DEQ 
staff left. Subsequently, the Gun Lake Tribe Trading Initiative 
has suffered several set-backs as a result of agency resistance 
to trading. For this reason, bottom-up approaches are perhaps 
more successful and easier to maintain over time. The Great 
Miami River Watershed Trading Pilot is one that has enjoyed 
considerable buy-in at the local level, which has led to signifi -
cant support for the program at the state level.
Where Next?
Water quality issues are on the rise—there has been a four-
fold increase in identifi ed hypoxic zones globally in the past 12 
years—and governments will increasingly look for new ways 
to deal with these problems. The prevalence of water quality 
trading programs has steadily grown and will likely continue 
to grow. While trading does not supplant regulation, it does 
provide a mechanism to help regulated sources meet their 
regulatory obligations at lower costs than traditional command 
and control approaches, and allows new or expanding regulated 
entities to operate within watersheds with nutrient caps. Over 
time, there is likely to be more standardization between trad-
ing programs and the infrastructure that supports them. In 
addition, trading processes will become more streamlined and 
effi cient. All of these developments are good news for those 
who believe that water quality trading can indeed be a cost-
effi cient mechanism to help meet water quality goals.
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The World Resources Institute has created an online trading tool—
NutrientNet—that can act as a registry, marketplace, and estimation 
tool. NutrientNet has been developed for the Gun Lake Tribe Trad-
ing Initiative and the Pennsylvania Water Quality Trading Program. 
It will also be used to underpin the programs in Maryland and West 
Virginia. NutrientNet is designed to serve the following functions:
• Provide farmers, sewage treatment plants, and industrial plants 
with tools for estimating nutrient losses to surface waters from 
their operations;
• Provide a marketplace where market participants can identify 
each other, and buy and sell credits; 
• Provide a registry that can track the volume and type of trades 
within a watershed; and 
• Provide potential market participants and other stakeholders with 
background information on nutrient trading.
See http://www.nutrientnet.org for more information.
BOX 4 NutrientNet—Water Quality Trading Online
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Nation%20River%20P%20Trading.pdf (accessed 110/2008)
 8. Environmental protection licenses are a central means to control 
the localized, cumulative, and acute impacts of pollution in NSW. 
They set limits on the pollutant loads emitted by holders of environ-
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1/10/2008)
